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TAX-DEPENDENCY DEDUCTIONS FOR PARAMOURS-
Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1979).
INTRODUCTION
In adhering to a constitutionally derived recognition of the
states within the federal system, Congress has consistently de-
ferred to the states in the regulation of marriage, family life and
domestic affairs.' In the application of the federal tax laws, Con-
gress has demonstrated its respect for the individual states by the
enactment of § 152(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code. This 1958
enactment denies a taxpayer an exemption for a dependent if the
relationship between the claimed dependent and the taxpayer vio-
lates local law.'
In Ensminger v. Commissioner 4 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a decision by the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue that denied a dependency exemption
for a live-in lover, because the relationship between the North Car-
olina taxpayer and his claimed dependent violated state law. This
note will review the decision in Ensminger and will explore its
implications.
THE CASE
Petitioner, a 28 year old man, shared his four room house in
Siler City, North Carolina, in 1974 with Frommeyer, a 21 year old
unrelated woman. Petitioner's house was Frommeyer's principal
place of residence and Frommeyer was a member of his house-
hold.5 Frommeyer was unemployed, had a gross income of less
than $750 and received no support from anyone other than
petitioner.'
Petitioner and Frommeyer were never legally married to each
1. Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1979).
2. All Internal Revenue Code references are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, as amended.
3. I.R.C. § 152(b)(5) provides: "An individual is not a member of the tax-
payer's household if at any time during the taxable year of the taxpayer the rela-
tionship between such individual and the taxpayer is in violation of local law."
4. 610 F.2d 189.
5. Ensminger v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 934, 935 (1977).
6. Id.
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other or to anyone else under any recognized state law or within
any ceremonial or common law meaning of the term.' Neverthe-
less, on his federal income tax return for 1974 petitioner catego-
rized Frommeyer as a dependent and claimed an exemption deduc-
tion for her. In addition, under sections 2(b) and 1(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code petitioner claimed the filing status and tax
rates reserved for "head of household."
Subsequently, the Commissioner9 disallowed petitioner's ex-
emption deduction and his use of the preferential "head of house-
hold" rates based upon the Commissioner's determination that pe-
titioner's claimed dependency exemption was foreclosed by §
152(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Commissioner con-
cluded that by living together during the taxable year, petitioner
and Frommeyer had violated North Carolina General Statute § 14-
184, which forbids wanton cohabitation between an unmarried
man and woman.10 Since the claimed dependency was denied and
because petitioner had no other dependents, the Commissioner re-
computed petitioner's tax liability without applying the "head of
household" rates and determined a deficiency of $128.11
By joint motion the parties submitted the dispute to the tax
court on totally stipulated facts." In a memorandum opinion"3 the
tax court upheld the Commissioner's decision and refused to con-
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. All references to the Commissioner refer to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1969) provides: "Fornication and adultery - If
any man and woman, not being married to each other, shall lewdly and lascivi-
ously associate, bed and cohabit together, they shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. . . .Any person violating any provision of this section shall be punish-
able by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00), imprisonment for not
more than six months, or both."
11. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 934.
12. Id. at 935. See also, Rule 122, Tax Court Rules of Practice provides:
"Submission Without Trial - (a) General. Any case not requiring a trial for the
submission of evidence (as, for example, where sufficient facts have been admit-
ted, stipulated established by deposition, or included in the record in some other
way), may be submitted at any time by notice of the parties filed with the Court.
The parties need not wait for the case to be calendared for trial and need not
appear in Court. The Chief Judge will assign such a case to a Division, which will
fix a time for filing briefs or for oral argument."
13. A tax court decision may not be reported officially if it involves primarily
factual determinations and the application of settled legal principles. However,
Commerce Clearing House and Prentice-Hall report the Memorandum decisions.
[Vol. 3:133
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sider petitioner's claims of a constitutional right of privacy or the
alleged unconstitutional vagueness of the North Carolina statute.14
The court determined that since petitioner chose not to allege a
lack of habitual sexual intercourse and since no mention of sexual
conduct existed within the stipulated facts, petitioner had failed to
carry the burden of proof placed upon him by Rule 142 of the Tax
Court Rules of Practice.16
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the tax court's decision.10 The court reiterated the defer-
ence that Congress has for the states in the regulation of matters
affecting marriages and held that it would be inappropriate for the
Commissioner to make subjective judgments about the constitu-
tionality of local laws affecting taxable status. The court also held
that § 152 (b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code did not unconstitu-
tionally violate petitioner's privacy rights and that North Carolina
General Statute § 14-184 was not unconstitutionally vague.
BACKGROUND
The tax court and Congress have consistently refused to con-
fer the status of a dependent upon one living in an illicit relation-
ship with a taxpayer. This refusal serves the policy of federal def-
erence to state authority in the regulation of domestic affairs and
serves to prevent the grant of the federal tax advantages of the
married status to taxpayers who are not married.
Even before the passage of § 152(b)(5) in 1958, the tax court
refused to grant an individual living in an adulterous relationship
with a taxpayer the status of a dependent within the meaning of §
152(a)(9).'1 In Turnipseed v. Commissioner,1 s Turnipseed, an un-
14. N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-184 (1969).
15. Rule 142, Tax Court Rules of Practice provides: "Burden of Proof - (a)
General. The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner, except as otherwise
provided by statute or determined by the Court; and except that, in respect of
any new matter, increases in deficiency, and affirmative defenses, pleaded in his
answer, it shall be upon the respondent."
16. 610 F.2d 189.
17. I.R.C. § 152 provides: "Dependent defined - (a) General definition. For
purposes of this subtitle, the term "dependent" means any of the following indi-
viduals over half of whose support, for the calendar year in which the taxable year
of the taxpayer begins, was received from the taxpayer (or is treated under sub-
section (c) or (e) as received from the taxpayer):
(9) An individual (other than an individual who at any time during the taxable
year was the spouse, determined without regard to section 143, of the taxpayer)
19811
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married man, claimed as a dependent a married and undivorced
woman with whom he lived as man and wife in the 1954 tax year."'
The couple's cohabitation violated the criminal laws of Alabama.20
At trial, the issue before the tax court was whether § 152(a)(9)
should be construed to include an individual living in an illicit re-
lationship with a taxpayer. The tax court disagreed with the pro-
position and reasoned that Congress had never intended for §
152(a)(9) to be interpreted to permit a dependency exemption for
an individual living in an illicit relatibnship with a taxpayer."1 The
court opined that to hold otherwise would ascribe to Congress the
intent to encourage a status that openly and willfully violated the
laws of Alabama.22
The possibility of successful claims for dependency deductions
in fact situations similar to Turnipseed prompted Congress to en-
act § 152(b)(5) in 1958.23 The Senate report on § 152(b)(5) quali-
fied the definition of a dependent. It stated:
On this point it is made clear that a person who is not a close
relative but is living with the taxpayer may not be claimed as a
dependent if the relationship between the taxpayer and the indi-
vidual is an illegal one under the applicable local law. For exam-
ple, this would make it clear that an individual who is a "com-
mon-law wife" where the applicable State law does not recognize
common law marriages would not qualify as a dependent of the
taxpayer. This qualification applies only to the definition of a de-
pendent under section 152(a)(9)."
Later cases in the tax court continued to refuse dependency
deductions for relationships in violation of local law. In Eichbauer
v. Commissioner,'2 Eichbauer claimed a divorced woman as his de-
pendent. The claimed dependent had a child by Eichbauer and the
couple was known in their community as husband and wife, but
the couple had not fulfilled the statutory requirements for mar-
who, for the taxable year of the taxpayer has as his principal place of abode the
home of the taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's household."
18. 27 T.C. 758 (1957).
19. Id. at 759.
20. ALA. CODE § 13-8-1 (1975).
21. 27 T.C. at 760.
22. Id. at 760-61.
23. 610 F.2d at 191.
24. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19581 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4791, 4804.
25. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 581 (1971).
[Vol. 3:133
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riage in the state of Washington where they lived. In addition, the
couple had not contracted or consummated a legally sufficient mar-
riage in any other state." The tax court noted that although the
state of Washington had not prosecuted the couple for the statu-
tory offense of lewd cohabitation,27 Eichbauer had failed to prove
that his relationship with the woman did not violate local law.
Consequently, the court denied Eichbauer's claimed exemption.
Similarly, in Martin v. Commissioner,"8 the tax court found
that Martin and his claimed dependent were never married in a
civil or religious ceremony even though the couple lived together
openly. The court also found that the couple's relationship violated
the laws of each of the three states that the couple lived in during
the 1970 tax year.'9 The court concluded that the dependency ex-
emption is founded on lawful relationships and that Martin's
claimed dependency exemption must be denied. 0
The North Carolina statutes " activated and applied against
Ensminger by § 152(b)(5) has never been declared unconstitutional
by any court.82 Cases applying North Carolina General Statute §
14-184 have appeared in North Carolina appellate courts as re-
cently as 1970. In State v. Robinson,38 Judge Hedrick based his
decision on Judge Bobbitt's earlier analysis of the statute in the
1954 case of State v. Kleiman." Judge Bobbitt's decision insisted
that a single act of illicit sexual intercourse is not fornication and
adultery as defined by the statute because, "'[1]ewdly and lascivi-
ously cohabit' plainly implies habitual intercourse in the manner of
husband and wife." 5 The court explained that the essence of the
offense combined habitual intercourse with the absence of a mar-
riage. Judge Bobbitt concluded that these elements distinguished
the offense from single or non-habitual intercourse.8 6
Therefore, when Ensminger arrived before the tax court,
26. Id. at 133.
27. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.79.120 (repealed 1975).
28. 42 T.C.M. (P-H) 639 (1973).
29. ALA. CODE § 13-8-1 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 798.01, .02 and .03 (West
1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11.7, 11.8 (Smith-Hurd 1977).
30. 42 T.C.M. (P-H) at 640.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1969).
32. 610 F.2d at 191.
33. 9 N.C. App. 433, 176 S.E.2d 253 (1970).
34. 241 N.C. 277, 85 S.E.2d 148 (1954).
35. Id. at 279, 280, 85 S.E.2d at 151.
36. Id. at 280, 85 S.E.2d at 151.
1981]
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North Carolina General Statute § 14-184 was a facially valid state
statute made applicable by § 152(b)(5). To avoid paying the defi-
ciency assessed against him and to obtain his claimed exemption,
Ensminger had to navigate around both § 152(b)(5) and North
Carolina General Statute § 14-184.
ANALYSIS
In the absence of any ruling or authority that North Carolina
General Statute § 14-184 was invalid, Chief Judge Haynsworth de-
clared that § 152(b)(5) required the Commissioner to apply the
North Carolina statute to Ensminger. The court doubted that Con-
gress deemed it appropriate for the Commissioner to make subjec-
tive judgments about the constitutionality of local laws; moreover,
no qualifying language existed in § 152(b)(5) that would limit its
applicability to just constitutionally valid local laws. Peripherally,
the court observed that if the constitutionality of state statutes
that activated § 152(b)(5) could be litigated in the tax court, then
the state, which has the primary interest in upholding its statutes,
would not even be present to defend them.3 7
Recognizing the deference that Congress holds for the states in
the regulation of domestic affairs, the court stated that Congress
itself had made no determination about the legality of any sort of
interpersonal relationships. Instead, the court said that § 152(b)(5)
simply extracted Congress from the awkward position of appearing
to reward relationships that were in contravention of local law.38
Although noting that the statute might produce some inequality in
taxation among the states, the court reiterated its support for the
deference that Congress has for the states in domestic and inter-
personal relationships. The court concluded it discussion of federal
deference by holding that a frontal attack on the constitutionality
of the North Carolina statute as an invasion of privacy rights was
inappropriate in a federal tax proceeding.39
Since petitioner was unable to maintain a right of privacy
claim against the North Carolina statute, the court entertained pe-
titioner's supplemental brief in which petitioner redirected his at-
tack against § 152(b)(5). By examining three landmark United
States Supreme Court decisions,40 the court held that "[a]ny con-
37. 610 F.2d at 191.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 192.
40. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Court refused to strike down
[Vol. 3:133
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ceivable impact of the federal statute upon the exercise of any con-
stitutionally protected right of privacy is so indirect and remote
... , that the federal statute may not be questioned on that
ground. ' 41 The court explained that § 152(b)(5) would not be sub-
jected to the "strict scrutiny" level of judicial examination because
of its indirect and remote nature. The court then determined that
the appropriate level of judicial examination was the "rational re-
lation" test, by noting that "[tihere is a rational basis for the fed-
eral statute in its attempt to conform the impact of the federal tax
9~42laws to state laws governing such personal relationships ... .
Accordingly, the court determined that § 152(b)(5) had no impact
on the couple's decision to cohabit and that the statute did not
prevent them from living together.43 The court also noted that §
152(b)(5) places no barriers before a state if a state decides to per-
mit sexual relations between unmarried and consenting adults."
The court concluded that any interference with privacy rights by §
152(b)(5) is neither direct nor substantial.
The court quickly dismissed the final issue raised by petitioner
by holding that North Carolina General Statute § 14-184 is not
unconstitutionally vague. The court said that the statute had been
held not to prohibit occasional sex acts but had been held to pro-
scribe habitual sexual intercourse in the kind of relationship that
Ensminger and Frommeyer exhibited.45 Given the prior construc-
tions of the statute by the North Carolina courts, Judge Hayn-
sworth determined that petitioner could not contend that he had
any lack of fair notice of the statute's application to his
relationship s.
In conclusion, the court affirmed the tax court by denying pe-
titioner his dependency deduction. Judge Haynsworth also indi-
the blue law at issue because it imposed only an indirect burden on the exercise of
religion); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (Court refused to strike down a
provision of the Social Security Act because its tangential impact upon a marital
decision did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (Court struck down a Wisconsin statute
that directly and substantially interfered with the affected party's right to marry).
41. 610 F.2d at 192.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 194.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. E.g., State v. Kleiman, 241 N.C. 277, 85 S.E.2d 198 (1954); State v. Davis,
229 N.C. 386, 50 S.E.2d 37 (1948); State v. McDuffie, 107 N.C. 885, 12 S.E.2d 83
(1890); State v. Robinson, 9 N.C. App. 433, 176 S.E.2d 253 (1970).
1981] 139
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cated that if petitioner wanted to pursue his claim of a constitu-
tional right of privacy, his action would not be foreclosed by the
court's decision and could be raised again in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.47
CONCLUSION
The court's decision in Ensminger v. Commissioner recon-
firmed the right of the state of North Carolina to define and pun-
ish interpersonal relationships that the state considers criminal
without the embarrassment of Congress rewarding the illicit activ-
ity through tax advantages. However, the policy of Congressional
deference to the states in the area of domestic and personal rela-
tionships will produce inconsistent results in the amount of -taxes
that taxpayers of different states must pay to the federal govern-
ment. For example, in 1975 California repealed its criminal sanc-
tions for sexual relations between consenting adults.48 A fact situa-
tion identical to Ensminger set in California would have altered
the result and Ensminger would have been allowed his dependency
exemption. On this basis Congress appears to be countenancing di-
rect geographic discrimination in the tax laws.
The court skirted the issue of an alleged constitutional right of
privacy, but indicated that if it existed, the impact of § 152(b)(5)
upon any privacy rights would not be direct or substantial enough
to invalidate the statute. The court also established that the Com-
missioner does not have the authority to subjectively determine
the constitutionality of state statutes, and that the tax court is an
inappropriate forum for attacking the constitutionality of state
statutes. Once again, this underscores that at least in the area of
domestic and interpersonal relationships, the state is the primary
authority. The Congressional role is limited to raising revenue
without usurping the authority of the states.
Scott MacDonald Taylor
47. 610 F.2d at 194.
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 269a. (West, repealed 1975).
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